by Ian Spence M.ISRM
Country Director, INSO Ukraine
Chair, ISRM Ukraine Chapter
One of the issues facing us in the gap between knowledge [theory] and capability [experience-based insight] is the specific lack of on the ground experience. Perhaps better, the lack of continuity between the two realms of experience. Perhaps the global informational network is having its effect on those at the sharp tip of the spear; Whether during the Second World War, the Bush War in South Africa or the current situation in Ukraine, finding someone with the right experience and the right education to translate the lessons into teachable and quantifiable bits is rare; more and more, the front line man self-selects, and the absurd commando-tacticool culture reinforces it. Where are the Orde Wingates and David Stirlings, even the Paddy Maynes?
From the ISRM Ukraine Chater WhatsApp Group (edited)
I have had time to reflect on some of the comments in this thread, and as I see it, one of the fundamental challenges facing this intellectual community is the growing disconnect between operational experience and intellectual development. Perhaps more accurately, it is the gradual erosion of continuity between the two.
Historically, there was often a natural progression from practitioner to thinker. Many of the military innovators we now study were not simply theorists sitting behind a desk or battlefield tacticians operating in isolation. They moved between both worlds. Wingate, Stirling and Mayne were not simply men of action; they were innovators who challenged convention, experimented, adapted and, in doing so, influenced thinking far beyond their own immediate operational environments.
We could just as easily add figures such as T. E. Lawrence, John Boyd and David Galula, all of whom transformed operational experience into concepts, doctrine and enduring intellectual frameworks. Their experience was not simply recorded as history; it became knowledge that could be taught, challenged, refined and passed on. I sometimes wonder whether the modern information environment is disrupting that process.
Unlike the Second World War, the Bush War in South Africa or many other twentieth-century conflicts, information today moves at an extraordinary pace. A soldier in Ukraine can watch drone footage from a strike that took place only minutes earlier, analyse tactics through social media, participate in online communities and exchange ideas with practitioners from across the world almost instantaneously. In theory, this should accelerate learning. In practice, I’m not convinced that it always does.
The frontline practitioner increasingly self-selects into highly specialised communities, while the rise of an often performative “commando-tacticool” culture can unintentionally reinforce experience as a badge of identity rather than something to be translated into doctrine, education and institutional learning.
My own perspective has undoubtedly been shaped by working across several different sectors, including the military, the private sector, corporate risk and, more recently, the humanitarian sector. One of the most valuable lessons I have learned is that innovation rarely emerges from professional silos. It almost always occurs at the point where different disciplines, experiences and perspectives intersect.
One of the reasons I have found the humanitarian sector so intellectually stimulating is that it has forced me to draw upon experiences from each of those professional environments. Concepts such as risk management, resilience, crisis leadership, duty of care, decision-making under uncertainty and organisational adaptation are not exclusive to any single profession. The principles remain remarkably consistent, even when the operational context changes.
Working in Ukraine has reinforced that belief. I have watched military lessons being adapted into humanitarian practice in almost real time. Whether considering drone threats, movement protocols, duty of care, critical incident management or organisational resilience, there is an ongoing exchange of ideas between military practitioners, humanitarian organisations, security professionals, analysts and policymakers. Yet I still think we face a significant strategic risk.
Ukraine is producing an extraordinary generation of practitioners with hard-earned experience in drone warfare, electronic warfare, dispersed operations and adaptation under persistent threat. However, unless that experience is deliberately captured, analysed and translated into doctrine, education and institutional learning, there is a very real possibility that much of it will remain anecdotal and eventually be lost.
Experience alone does not automatically become knowledge. Knowledge does not automatically become doctrine. And doctrine does not automatically become institutional learning. That requires institutions. It requires intellectual curiosity. It requires mentorship. It requires people who can move comfortably between the field, academia, policy and leadership. The strategic risk is that we create two separate communities: academics without operational credibility and practitioners without institutional influence.
So perhaps the question isn’t, where are the next Wingates, Stirlings or Maynes? I don’t know, but for me the more important question is this: Are we still creating environments that allow people to bridge these different worlds, or have we become so specialised that we no longer recognise the value of those who can translate experience into something that can be taught, measured, challenged and ultimately passed on to the next generation?
