NGOs, Disaster Relief and Asset Transfer in the Horn: Political Survival in a Permanent Emergency

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ABSTRACT

Famines have winners and losers. Conventional analysis has concentrated on the losers: what has been neglected is that famines can result from the conscious exercise of power in pursuit of gain or advantage by the politically strong. This article is an attempt to analyse the process of political survival in the context of permanent emergency. Through examples of local asset transfer, and indicating how this process articulates with a wider regional parallel economy, the paper offers an analysis of political survival in the arc of crisis that runs from Sudan through southern Ethiopia to Somalia. The role of donors and NGOs is examined in terms of how they relate to the weak and the strong within the asset transfer economy. Donors are seen to have supported the strong whilst the position of NGOs is more contradictory. Although programme measures to protect assets have been developed, and the disjuncture between the rules of sovereignty and the protection of human rights has been highlighted, these measures have essentially failed. A review of trends since the end of the Cold War suggests that the chances of preventing the further consolidation of a transfer economy within the region are negligible. The position of those who gain from such a destructive process seems assured.

Since the 1980s, an important aspect of the new global interdependence that is emerging has been the increasing frequency of large-scale, complex disasters (Childers and Urquhart, 1991). In parts of Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia and, especially, Africa, the lives of millions of people are now regularly and variously affected by a number of disaster agents. Two defining features of the complexity of these emergencies are that they are often highly politicized and that attempts to relieve suffering are

increasingly highlighting the inadequacies of the present international humanitarian system (Rees, 1991).

Not all Southern governments have welcomed international emergency intervention. Sudan is a case in point. Since the mid-1980s, successive regimes have denied or minimized the humanitarian crisis (Cater, 1986) and, in various ways, have attempted to constrain the unbroken line of emergency operations that now span nearly a decade (Africa Watch, 1990a, 1990c). A common strand in this resistance has been contention over who controls non-governmental agencies (NGOs) and their resources. In the preceding article, Abdel Ati, although commenting on NGO activity in Red Sea Province, provides a good example of a wider political consensus over this period. Briefly, rather than supporting under-resourced government structures, international NGOs are seen as establishing an exclusive parallel system which has had undesirable consequences. These include acting to separate government and citizens, creating a reliance on external resources within government departments and squeezing out national NGOs. In other words, indigenous structures have been weakened rather than strengthened. NGO relief programmes, moreover, are said to have created a dependency on food aid, disrupting established economic activities and, insofar as they have attempted to conserve semi-subsistence economies, have ignored the modernizing trends of sedentarization and urbanization that are at work.

Such views are now common in many African countries and, in relation to NGO humanitarian involvement in conflict situations, they have often received a more acute expression including, as in Sudan, the expulsion of agency staff and the confiscation of communications equipment. Rather than looking at this clash in its local setting (for which, see Duffield, 1991b), this article will examine such antagonism as part of a new and emerging form of political survival.

POLITICAL SURVIVAL IN THE CONTEXT OF PERMANENT EMERGENCY

The present transition period has highlighted the inadequacy of conventional analysis and terminology. In the case of Sudan, for example, outsiders could be forgiven for having difficulty in understanding how governance has survived over the past decade.
Since the early 1980s, successive famines have impoverished the north; civil war and famine have devastated the south; violence and instability have become widespread; prices for its staple exports have fallen; official debt has burgeoned; and, in recent years, there has been a growing antipathy on the part of northern donors. In many respects, Sudan appears to have entered a stage of 'permanent emergency'. Belying this impression, however, it is also true that since the fundamentalist backed coup of June 1989, the government has not only strengthened its political and economic base; it has regained military momentum in the south, survived the negative consequences of its support for Iraq in the Gulf War and, allegedly, has sufficient confidence to involve itself in the internal politics of several of its neighbours (Jamal, 1991). Rather than collapse, in many respects, a form of 'development' or consolidation has taken place.

The phenomenon of political survival in the context of permanent emergency is poorly understood. Somalia is another good example. It suggests the emergence of a new and radical form of economy which can be understood only partially, if at all, through conventional forms of analysis (Brown, 1992). As complex disasters continue to develop, uncovering this economy will become increasingly important during the course of the 1990s.

**Limitations of Conventional Analysis**

A key proposition in the analysis of political survival is that disasters have winners as well as losers. The analysis of famine in Africa has, with obvious justification, tended to concentrate on the losers. Since the mid-1980s, for example, a growing body of literature has drawn attention to how vulnerable groups attempt to survive growing environmental and economic stress (Longhurst, 1986; de Garine and Harrison, 1988; Swift, 1989). Apart from reducing food consumption, the coping strategies involved can include such things as labour migration, petty trading activities, gathering wild foodstuffs and, usually as a last resort, the sale of assets such as livestock or jewellery. Livestock prices in the Sahel, for example, are sensitive to the availability of food and fall at times of scarcity as more animals chase less grain.

During the latter part of the 1980s, policy debate was informed by such observations. Within a framework in which famine was
usually conceived as a transitory and largely natural phenomenon, measures have been suggested to strengthen the coping strategies of the losers. In addition, various managerial solutions have been developed to deal with such temporary emergencies. There have been attempts, for example, to establish famine early warning systems which would monitor livestock prices and trigger various market and nutritional support mechanisms as necessary. The role of NGOs and the state has been understood in relation to this conventional support and managerial model (IDS, 1988).

It should be clearly stated that the basic principle behind the work on coping strategies is of vital importance. That is, people are not passive victims but take a pro-active response to crisis. Nevertheless, it can be argued to represent only one side of a wider political equation. Coping strategies, especially in more extreme circumstances, involve the transfer of assets away from those in distress. Previously, this aspect has often been neglected. As Keen (1991) has argued, what has been overlooked is the fact that local merchants and middlemen, for example, stand to make significant gains in such circumstances. Moreover, such people are often powerful local actors capable, through neglect or even design, of moulding market conditions to their advantage. As the merchants of Mogadishu have shown, winners can be as pro-active as losers.

**Toward a Political Economy of Permanent Emergency**

The conventional approach neglects the question of power and whether famine can be the result of its conscious exercise in pursuit of gain or advantage. It is this political as opposed to economic construction of African famine which has been argued to limit the usefulness of Sen’s (1981) entitlement analysis (de Waal, 1990; Keen, 1991). From a political perspective, not only is it unnecessary for famine to be natural or the result of market failure, it need not even be temporary if its continuation is advantageous to the powerful.

Prompted by the continuation of internal conflict in many parts of Africa, such criticism has begun to take shape as a new analysis of the situation. This approach argues that complex disasters, such as modern famine, have distinct political economies structured by relations of power and gender (Downs et al., 1991). Within this
Political Survival in the Horn framework, famine can be regarded as an outcome of a process of impoverishment resulting from the transfer of assets from the weak to the politically strong. Moreover, it allows for the sectarian activities of the latter in support of this process. The increasing transparency of such activities is a major factor in the deepening crisis within the international humanitarian system.

Using this approach, this article will analyse the phenomenon of political survival in a permanent emergency by examining whether the actions of the state and its internal clients, together with those of external donors and NGOs, support the weak or the strong in the process of asset transfer. First, however, it is necessary to briefly describe some of the characteristics of a permanent emergency.

EXAMPLES OF LOCAL ASSET TRANSFER

Evidence suggests that during the 1980s, as the formal economy and hence the opportunities for legitimate wealth creation declined, the local transfer of assets from weak to politically strong ethnic groups began to gather momentum. This development marks a major, yet little understood transformation in the regional economy. In the light of the available evidence, the outline of this change can be most clearly discerned in Sudan. Asset transfer, as a growing practice, can be contrasted with the 1960s and early 1970s, when agriculture, linked to the growth of the internal market, reached the peak of its development (O'Brien, 1985).

In north Sudan, at least initially, asset transfer occurred through the manipulation of the market. In the south, and more recently in the north, the restriction of food aid has been followed by the increasing use of violence as a means of direct appropriation. Using the neighbouring Baggara and Dinka populations in southwest Sudan as a detailed case study, Keen (1991) has demonstrated that the terrible 1988 famine amongst the Dinka of Bahr al Ghazal was not a result of their poverty but — on the contrary — of their natural wealth in cattle. This position of relative wealth had been highlighted by the impoverishment of their Baggara neighbours to the north through enviro-economic decline, including the loss of rangelands as a result of the mechanization of agriculture. Keen has pointed out an essential aspect of asset transfer without which the violent appropriation of Dinka cattle during the mid-1980s could not have taken place: the long-term process of political
marginalization and the stripping from the Dinka of all legitimation. In the eyes of the Baggara raiders, the Dinka were not fit to hold such wealth. This is a crucial observation since it makes a direct link between famine and the political process.

In north Sudan, the forms of legitimation which have accompanied the emergence of the transfer economy have been the steady re-Islamization of the state and the resurgence of civil war. In the case of the Baggara, enviro-economic decline meant that they became ready tools in the government's strategy of arming irregular militias, a strategy associated with the Umma Party which has traditionally drawn its strength from the Arabs of west Sudan. Since decimating northern Bahr al Ghazal, the Baggara militias (Murahaleen), in conjunction with Zaghawa raiders had, by the late 1980s, begun to put growing pressure on the Fur in central Darfur (Africa Watch, 1990b). More recently, the Murahaleen have also been increasingly active against the Nuba in the Nuba Mountains (Africa Watch, 1991b). The militia strategy, established in the mid-1980s and consolidated by the present fundamentalist regime, thus satisfies both the local economic needs of clients and the wider political aims of the state in opening southwest Sudan to Arab settlement.

Asset transfer in the north also has an urban dimension. Since 1990, helped by new legislation which gives sweeping powers to the state, over 500,000 of the mainly western and southern squatters and displaced persons living in Khartoum have been forced to relocate to agricultural 'productive areas' or badly resourced 'peace cities' located some distance away. Despite official resistance, many squatters had managed to secure basic amenities in the areas in which they lived. Given Khartoum's growing urbanization, this land became an increasingly valuable asset. As in the past, forced relocation, often carried out with the wilful destruction of shelter and belongings, has been accompanied by casting the victims as criminals and a political fifth column. A new development, however, has been the pledging of the confiscated land and buildings to neighbouring Arab residents, or client members of the civil service, police or militias (Africa Watch, 1992b).

In south Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) has used different forms of legitimation to underpin local asset transfer in securing its own physical survival. During the latter part of the 1980s, its alliance with the Ethiopian Dergue allowed it to use local opposition to the resettlement and villagization programme in southeast Ethiopia as a pretext to loot, especially in Illubabor
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Province (Africa Watch, 1991a). More widely, however, it has relied upon the manipulation of traditional enmities between local ethnic groups through a process of selective arming with modern weapons. In southeast Ethiopia, for example, it has played on the traditional hostility between the two linguistically related branches of the Nilo-Saharan: the Chai and Mursi on one side, and the Nyangatom, Toposa and Turkana on the other (Alvarsson, 1989). In south Sudan, in order to secure a base and provisions near the Uganda border, the SPLA made use of the long-standing hostility between the Acholi and the Madi (Allen, 1989). Since the mid-1980s, this process of selective arming, also engaged in by the Sudanese Army, has produced great instability along Sudan's borders with Uganda and Kenya. Local food wars have developed as losers have attempted to make good their loss.

LOCAL ASSET TRANSFER AND THE PARALLEL ECONOMY

One need not labour the point that the emergence of an asset transfer economy is extremely destructive, contravenes humanitarian law and creates an ever-deepening pool of destitution and misery. Moreover, since subsistence assets are a finite resource, once such an economy is established it demands fresh inputs as the wealth of different groups is exhausted. Asset transfer becomes a 'movable feast' on the ethnic landscape.

Since the 1980s, many social groups in Sudan have, in the sense of being distinct socio-economic entities, been badly crippled or killed off altogether. Although systematic evidence is in short supply (Ryle, 1989), one could cite the Maban, Uduk (James, 1988) and Anuak (Duku, 1988) in Upper Nile, the Chai (Africa Watch, 1991a), and Mursi (Turton, 1989) in southeast Ethiopia, and the Mundari in Equatoria, as well as those ethnic groups mentioned above. The current military offensive in south Sudan is expected to unleash a further wave of asset stripping and displacement (de Waal, 1992).

It would be a mistake to regard local asset transfer as an anarchic process, however. The issue of local conflict in relation to the wider alliances of internal warfare has been explored elsewhere (Duffield, 1991a): what should be emphasized here is that at many points local asset transfer is integrated with a parallel economy controlled at the highest political level. The connection between the militia strategy
and the wider aims of the Sudanese state has already been mentioned. The following section will show how the regional circuit of parallel exchange also articulates with the logic of permanent emergency.

_A An Example of Regional Parallel Exchange_

It should be emphasized that asset transfer is not bound by nation-states but is regional in character. An arc of instability and fragmentation now runs from Sudan, through southern Ethiopia to Somalia (Bowden, 1992). It is an area greater in size than Western Europe yet, apart from sporadic disaster reporting, it receives scant media attention and even less systematic analysis.

During the latter part of the 1980s, some of the illegal dollar remittances of Sudanese workers in the Middle East were being exchanged, via hidden trade links across the war zone of south Sudan, on the coast-to-coast parallel exchange networks of northern Uganda and Zaire. The emergence of a hidden foreign exchange market is a crucial aspect of the parallel economy in Sudan. It has been estimated that between 1978 and 1987 capital flight from Sudan amounted to $11 billion dollars or roughly the equivalent of Sudan's entire foreign debt (Brown, 1992). Access to such significant amounts of hard currency has increasingly shaped the antagonistic relations at the centre of northern Sudanese politics (Jamal, 1991). The illegal dollar trade has traditionally been in the hands of a few powerful Khatmiyya merchants; the Democratic Unionist Party is linked with the Khatmiyya and, towards the end of the 1980s, was also in a fractious coalition with the Umma Party and the fundamentalist National Islamic Front. Since the fundamentalist coup of June 1989, the internal struggle to control the parallel currency market has become increasingly bitter.

The involvement of army officers in trade within the war zone is widespread (Africa Watch, 1990a). Most of this trade exploits the shortage of food and basic commodities amongst war-affected populations by using the army's ability to prevent population movement and its monopoly of transport. At best, it is asset transfer through barter, the terms of which are heavily loaded to the advantage of the merchant-officer.² In the late 1980s, one point of entry into the parallel economy for illegal dollars exploited the links of the
DUP/Khatmiyya with the army. The dollar trade went through Juba, the capital of south Sudan. Having cut the overland routes and deterred civilian airlines from landing, the SPLA blockade meant that, apart from military transport, the only way anything got in or out of Juba was by periodic donor/NGO airlifts of relief food or by the irregular convoys, organized and guarded by the army, to and from the Ugandan border.

The hard currency flown into Juba by the military was taken by armed convoy to the Ugandan border. Within northern Uganda, Sudanese merchants traded these dollars on the Uganda/Zaire parallel market. In a detailed account, Meagher (1990) describes this network as linking Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Zaire, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia. In the late 1980s, the chief players were Zairois with gold wanting imported goods, food and fuel; Sudanese with dollars wanting food, clothing and, especially, coffee; and Ugandans with imported goods wanting gold and dollars for Kampala's parallel market. This was not barter trade but took place in hard currency and convertible commodities and was sensitive to international exchange rates.

From Uganda, coffee and other merchant goods were transported, again in convoy, back to Juba; from there the coffee was flown by military transport to Khartoum where it was traded on the national and international market. It should be noted that the public reason for these convoys from Uganda was to carry donor food aid which had been brought to the border: however, the convoy system proved extremely unreliable in this respect. Toward the end of the 1980s, not only was the route becoming increasingly insecure, but merchant supplies would invariably be substituted for relief food. This is also true of military convoys in other areas of south Sudan (Africa Watch, 1990a). In Juba, substitution had several implications. Due to the growing SPLA blockade, the price of foodstuffs had begun to climb steeply leaving many of the town's residents worse off than the displaced population (Graham and Borton, 1992). Merchant goods imported under army auspices were therefore at a premium and could be used to commercial advantage. From the point of view of emergency relief, however, the unreliability of the convoy system and insecurity of the overland routes forced the donor/NGO safety net to rely increasingly on expensive, stop-gap airlifts of emergency supplies.
Some Internal Aspects of Political Survival

Within this arc of instability in the Horn of Africa, then, a shrinking resource base and decline in formal economic opportunity has seen an increasing transfer of assets from the weak to the politically strong. This local transfer is integrated with a regional parallel economy. In the case of Sudan, different aspects of this economy come together in the state where they are controlled and contested by sectarian political interests. It is an inherently authoritarian, violent and disaster producing structure. In relation to Somalia, where the growth of parallel activity was prophesied more than a decade ago as leading to breakdown (Miller, 1981; also see Jamal, 1988), it is possible to interpret the present situation as a division of the country along clan lines, each controlling different aspects of the parallel economy (Africa Watch, 1992a). This is, however, only a partial description of the power relations involved in the structure of permanent emergency: the disaster relief response of the international community also has a role. Moreover, aspects of this intervention also connect with the parallel economy.

NGOs and the Subcontracting of Disaster Relief

Africa became the world's largest regional recipient of food aid and humanitarian assistance in the later years of the 1980s. As this concentration grew, NGOs became increasingly important in the management and targeting of aid (Borton and Shoham, 1989). This trend, encouraged by increasing donor willingness to direct official aid away from Southern states and through NGOs (Clark, 1991), has also seen the growth in their budgets and organizational capacity. In net terms, NGOs now collectively transfer more resources to the South than the World Bank.

In Africa, northern intervention has encouraged the emergence of a neo-liberal, two-tier system of public welfare. From the end of the 1970s, IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes have been attempting, with highly debatable consequences, to stimulate market reform and encourage producers. For those people unable to benefit from these measures, a welfare 'safety net' has emerged since the mid-1980s, largely as a result of NGO activity. IMF/World Bank programmes are currently in operation in thirty African countries and welfare safety nets, particularly associated with disaster
relief, are found in about a dozen. These two measures, currently being modified in relation to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, can be argued to have coalesced during the 1980s into the North’s regional policy for Africa.

The safety net system in Africa can be divided into compensatory or development programmes, and targeted relief operations. Typical relief programmes involve a contractual relation between an international donor and an NGO, whereby the latter acts as an implementing agent for the former in an agreed programme of assistance. If present at all, African governments usually play a symbolic role. The growth of official funding channelled through NGOs, reinforced by the high cost of relief work, has given donors a significant measure of influence over welfare priorities as the safety net system has spread. This trend, which is not without its NGO critics (Borton and Shoham, 1989), has changed many NGOs from relatively independent bodies into implementers of donor policy. As a style of work, which can include development as well as relief goals, it is sometimes known as ‘public service contracting’ (Korten, 1990).

Relief operations have drawn many types of NGO, including African agencies, into subcontracting relations. Typical forms of organization have involved consortia of agencies, in some cases around a dozen NGOS, operating in different relief theatres. Such consortia, usually supported by several donors, are often shaped around a division of labour based either on geographical area or on function, such as transport, food distribution, medical services, nutritional surveillance and so on (Duffield, 1990).

**DISASTER RELIEF AND THE SUPPORT OF THE POLITICALLY STRONG**

In the 1980s, aid to Africa usually followed a Cold War logic. Regimes inclined to the West received help whilst those still pursuing a planned alternative were less favourably treated. Significant changes, however, were under way. In 1977, the Carter Administration made the receipt of American development aid, although not emergency assistance, conditional on the respect of human rights (Tomaseveski, 1989). Whilst never rigorously applied by the Americans, and virtually ignored by the main European donors in the Horn, this distinction between development and emergency
assistance, which appears to raise humanitarian relief above politics, created a political space which allowed Western donors to intervene in an emergency capacity in socialist Ethiopia.

Despite the directing of donor assistance away from governments and toward NGOs, Western emergency assistance itself became increasingly important as a means of state support as development aid began to decline toward the end of the 1980s. It should be emphasized, however, that much of this help is an indirect consequence of the manner in which disaster relief is organized: essentially, one is dealing with a contradictory and inadequate form of assistance which is open to exploitation and abuse.

Government Finance

Government finance has been a major beneficiary of international relief operations. In Ethiopia and Sudan, this has been facilitated by the pegging of official exchange rates at artificially low levels. In the late 1980s, for example, foreign relief assistance was being exchanged in Ethiopia at 2.07 Birr to the dollar. This was two or three times lower than the market rate and, in effect, represented a 100-150 per cent relief tax (in addition to import duties, port charges, licence fees, etc.) on the emergency programme (Africa Watch, 1991a). Given that the total disaster budget topped a billion dollars in 1989, it can be appreciated that the relief tax was an important source of foreign exchange and treasury support. The pegging of exchange rates in this manner has made relief operations in the Horn amongst the most expensive in the world.

Diversion of Food Aid

In a sectarian, asset transfer economy, the control of food aid is of vital strategic importance. In the Horn, the diversion of food aid to feed troops and militias at the same time as denying relief to contested areas has been widespread. In Somalia, the diversion of refugee food was already an established parallel activity in the 1970s (Miller, 1981; Jamal, 1988). In Ethiopia, relief food was regularly used to feed government troops and, especially, its unpaid peasant militia. Similar diversions have occurred on both sides in south Sudan. It is important to note that in a large-scale relief operation,
such as that in Ethiopia, a diversion rate of around 5 per cent (usually regarded by donors as an acceptable level of leakage) could be sufficient to feed considerable numbers. In the case of Ethiopia, 5 per cent would have fed 300,000 to 400,000 people in the latter part of the 1980s, or an equivalent of the entire armed forces (Africa Watch, 1991a). Diversions of strategic import do not therefore require the disappearance of large proportions of incoming aid.

Another aspect of the diversion of food aid concerns the co-option of NGO subcontractors. In a situation of internal war or divided governance, especially, it is almost inevitable that NGO relief operations, lacking an international mandate or externally guaranteed access, will be co-opted by one side or another. ‘Might’ is usually ‘right’ in such circumstances. It has been estimated, for example, that more than 90 per cent of all international relief assistance was distributed in areas controlled by the Ethiopian Dergue (Africa Watch, 1991a). North Sudan has similarly monopolized the international relief programme.

Tacit Donor Support and the Denial of Food Aid

In Sudan, the denial of international food aid to contested areas has been accomplished by a variety of means including an official reluctance to acknowledge emergency conditions; assurances to donors that relief supplies were reaching south Sudan; claiming insurmountable security and logistical problems to account for in-terminable delays; denying access for assessment purposes; and plain obstruction. Food denial in the Horn (an important aspect of asset transfer), whilst not encouraged by Northern donors, did receive tacit donor support in terms of their failure to effectively challenge government policy and, even when evidence of abuse existed, their reluctance to insist on an accountable relief programme (Cutler, 1988; Africa Watch, 1990a, 1991a; Keen, 1991). In the last analysis, it was donor emergency aid, supplied by Northern taxpayers, which was being denied or diverted.

Grain Speculation

The delays between assessment and the delivery of emergency food aid, together with the increasing demand on the world’s emergency
stock, has meant that stated emergency requirements have seldom been met in full or on time (Keen, 1992). This has necessitated various stop-gap measures which have, in turn, created opportunities for speculative activity.

Local purchase and swap arrangements are two of the main measures. The mechanized production of sorghum in northern Sudan, at a time when the world price for coarse grain is depressed, has been assisted by recurrent famine. The need for local purchase, in particular, has provided a source of speculative earnings (Cutler and Keen, 1989). Swap arrangements usually involve the securing of local grain against food normally imported on a commercial basis for the urban market. In Sudan, these swaps are notorious for their delays and speculative rates of exchange. The Islamic Banks have a history of such speculation, having been accused of hoarding during the 1984–5 famine (Cater, 1986). Since being made responsible for managing Sudan’s strategic food reserve following the 1989 coup, similar controversy surrounds the export of Sudan’s strategic reserve, despite evidence of returning famine conditions during 1989–90 (Africa Watch, 1990c).

**DISASTER RELIEF AND THE POLITICALLY WEAK**

Given the indirect and appropriated benefits that disaster relief can impart to the politically strong, it is legitimate to ask what the losers, the object of the disaster intervention, actually receive. Where estimates have been made, the answer is, broadly speaking, very little. In Darfur during 1984–5, in relatively good operational conditions, it has been suggested that the international relief programme supplied no more than 12 per cent of required assistance (de Waal, 1988). In Ethiopia, a figure of 10 per cent has been suggested (Africa Watch, 1991a). The other 90 per cent or so has been supplied through people’s own coping strategies including, of course, the transfer of assets to more fortunate and powerful groups. Despite the growth of NGOs and their frequent cooperation in consortia, the sheer scale of impoverishment means that NGOs are overstretched, under-resourced and, even aside from political obstacles, frequently face major logistical constraints. Subcontracting from individual donors, moreover, makes for fragmentation and poor overall coordination. In almost every respect, the donor/NGO safety net is an inadequate response.
For donors, the basic principle of African relief operations is to define, usually according to nutritional status, the most vulnerable groups within a population and to target them with the minimum necessary food, water and shelter to sustain life (Borton and Shoham, 1989). The problem here is that one is not dealing with a temporary emergency involving a normally robust and self-sustaining population which can eventually resume its former life. A process of sustained asset transfer is synonymous with the spread of mass impoverishment. Relief operations may, to varying degrees, help keep people alive but, at best, this is all they do. The way such programmes are conceived and resourced means they are usually unable to tackle the process of resource depletion which is equated with famine.

Despite the limitations of international intervention, often under impossible conditions, many NGOs are trying to support the weak. The donor/NGO relationship is, itself, potentially antagonistic. Not all NGOs involved in relief work have uncritically embraced a subcontracting role. This conflict, and the manner in which agencies have attempted to align themselves either to the weak or, by default, to the strong in the process of asset transfer, has effected a rough division between 'progressive' and 'conservative' NGOs. Such distinctions, operating within the logic of subcontracting, are more important than any cultural difference between international and national NGOs. Progressive NGO relief policy can be considered at two levels: firstly, at a programme level where measures are taken to protect assets; and secondly, at a strategic level where NGO activity exposes the disjuncture between the norms of international relations and the actual process of political survival in a permanent emergency.

The Protection of Livestock in Sudan

The fall in the price of livestock compared to grain during periods of food shortage has already been mentioned. In south and north Sudan, some NGOs have attempted to use food aid to support the pastoralist economy. During the mid-1980s, for example, before the effects of the war made conditions impossible, Oxfam's relief strategy in Equatoria was to lobby for relief food as a means of stabilizing the meat/grain exchange rate and so prevent stress sales to Juba-based merchants (Stockton, 1986). This strategy was
underpinned by an understanding that the anthropometric measurement of children as a guide to nutritional status was not a reliable measure of crisis amongst pastoralists (Daniell, 1985). Child nutrition is directly related to the possession of cattle within the extended family. A better gauge of stress would therefore be an assessment of herd condition and the immanence, due to market collapse or insecurity, of its loss. Once pastoralist children register as malnourished, the socio-economic integrity of the group has usually been damaged beyond repair.

The arid Red Sea Province in east Sudan was the site of a different application of this strategy. Here, Oxfam lobbied donors for a 'food for recovery' programme. Its rationale was that, having lost most of their goats through drought, the continuing pressure on the Beja pastoralists to sell animals in order to obtain grain meant that herds would never recover. Eventually, the herders would gravitate to the slums of Port Sudan. Long-term food aid, monitored by Oxfam, was therefore argued to be necessary to restore the pastoralist economy (Walker, 1987).

It should be noted that the above strategy, as well as containing many unanswered questions, demands a different and more liberal approach to food aid. Rather than nutritional support, it represents a form of economic redistribution to the weak. As such, this type of programme has had great difficulty in attracting donor support, especially over the long term, and has frequently aroused local opposition from politicians, merchants or landowners who have felt their advantage to be threatened. This opposition has frequently cited as criticism the 'dependency' which food aid is alleged to create amongst its recipients.

**Opposing the Abuse of Sovereignty**

During the Biafran civil war, when French medical workers chose to speak out, the tradition of silence on human rights abuse as represented by the International Committee of the Red Cross was broken (Weiss and Campbell, 1991). Since that time, and especially following the Gulf War, some NGOs have increasingly questioned the use of sovereignty as a cover for human rights violation (Oxfam, 1991b; Save the Children Fund, 1991).

African relief operations have been formative in the development of this position. There are a number of examples of NGO consortia
having emerged in the Horn as a result of the contradictions between sovereignty and humanitarian assistance. The Khartoum-based Emergency Relief Desk, for example, backed by a number of European Protestant NGOs, was reorganized in the mid-1980s to channel cross-border relief into Eritrea and Tigray (Hendrie, 1990). ERD played a significant role in countering the food denial policy of the Ethiopian Dergue. Several other NGO consortia have supported relief work in Eritrea and Tigray.

The Issue of Neutrality in South Sudan

In response to the growing effects of the war in Equatoria, the Combined Agency Relief Team (CART) was established in April 1986, in Juba, by a combination of national church-based agencies and international NGOs as a relief transport consortium (Graham and Borton, 1992). The formation of CART coincided with elections held in north Sudan which, amidst high hopes for a negotiated end to war, returned Sadiq El Mahdi to office. Both CART and the elections were seen by donors, including the EC, as a potential for unblocking the obstacles for relief in south Sudan and, at least initially, CART attracted EC funding. The NGOs also realized the potential of the situation and in June issued a joint public statement which detailed the destruction of ‘the very fabric of community and village life’ in south Sudan and called on both sides in the conflict to establish an urgent food truce (‘Churches’, 1986).

During the following months, however, instead of moving towards peace, a deepening political polarization occurred with both sides increasingly determined to prevent food aid reaching south Sudan. In this situation, establishing the neutrality of CART became an operational necessity (Stockton, 1986). In July, after vigorous lobbying by CART, the UN was persuaded to provide a diplomatic umbrella in an attempt to guarantee CART’s neutrality to outside parties (UNEOS, 1986). The situation, however, continued to deteriorate. In September, the government’s Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), which was also being supported by the EC, began to allege that CART was feeding the SPLA. Throughout the autumn, the northern press carried xenophobic and increasingly anti-NGO stories. By this time, the donor’s public support for neutrality had begun to wane. In December, several agency staff were expelled from Juba; at the same time the RRC was
making a determined effort to gain control of the south Sudan relief operation. Having a foot in both camps, the EC's response to the crisis was to limit the possibility of political damage to itself by summarily withdrawing funding from CART (Duffield, 1986).

At this point, the struggle for neutrality was lost. With the exception of Juba, where CART was compelled to reorganize, the RRC now controlled relief operations in south Sudan and the resulting denial of food aid during 1987 was a contributory factor to the famine of 1988.

FAILURE OF ATTEMPTS TO SUPPORT THE WEAK

We can now return to the issue of political survival in a permanent emergency. This can be seen as a complex structure involving, at one level, the disaster-producing articulation of local asset transfer with a wider parallel economy. International emergency intervention, rather than eradicating the disaster situation, appears in many respects to strengthen it. By its nature, especially its lack of political will to enforce an accountable system, international intervention opens new avenues for the politically strong in terms of state financial support, legitimation, access to strategic resources and speculative profit. Unwittingly, it has become an integral part of an established political economy which, pathologically, is geared to the spread of absolute poverty and human degradation. Whilst there have been some exceptions, attempts by international NGOs to support the weak have generally failed. In a few places a partial or temporary respite, at best, may have been achieved. This failure is not due to the reluctance of NGOs to 'speak out' (Bonner, 1989) but has much deeper origins:

- Relief supplies have never been adequate and have often arrived late. Moreover, there has been a reluctance by donors to move beyond the fragmented and minimalist targeting of inputs, towards measures which restore assets.
- With the limited exception of America, there has been a tendency for donors to tacitly support policies which further asset transfer. This has left NGO subcontractors in a weak position.
- The UN Charter, the mandates of the UN specialist agencies and the Geneva Conventions — in other words, the foundations of the international political system — do not adequately cover the
realities of political survival in the context of permanent emergency. Not only have donors left NGOs in a weak position, NGOs have had to operate in a legal vacuum with no humanitarian mandate or right of access.

The ending of the Cold War has accelerated the emergence of a new global strategic balance. In order to judge how this may affect the situation in the Horn, we will briefly review recent developments in the areas of failure listed above.

**Stagnation and Redirection of Aid Flow**

With the collapse of superpower confrontation, the political rationale for aid to Africa has disappeared (Griffin, 1991). Evidence would suggest that since 1990 overall aid flow to Africa has been stagnating.

**Food Aid**

Between 1989 and 1991, food aid receipts have continued to rise but they have not kept pace with demand. At a time when the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) is critically low, this situation has been complicated by increasing competition from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EE/FSU). From nothing in 1989, food aid receipts in these regions reached 9.6 per cent of the world total by 1991. Whilst the volume of food aid has been maintained in Africa, there have been a number of significant internal shifts, especially by the EC. In 1991, the EC supplied 52 per cent of all the food aid going to EE/FSU; this constitutes 36 per cent of its global allocation as compared to 32 per cent to Africa (Benson and Clay, 1992). This redirection is, as yet, unmatched by other food aid donors. If competition increases, matters could be further complicated by current demands for trade liberalization: it has been argued that such measures will reduce global agricultural stocks and increase the cost of food aid (Taylor, 1992).

Although food aid receipts to Africa have been maintained, it has been as a consequence of unparalleled NGO and UN lobbying. During 1990, the increase in food aid to Africa was regarded by NGOs as inadequate. The following year, an unprecedented joint agency 'Don't Forget Africa' campaign was launched in Britain (Oxfam, 1991a). Given flagging donor interest in African famine
(Hertsgaard, 1992), this campaign found it necessary to focus on food insecurity on a continent-wide, single issue basis so as to have maximum impact with donors. Until 1991, food aid lobbying had been done on a country or, occasionally, a regional basis. One can expect the continuation of desperate NGO campaigns during the 1990s (Simmons, 1992).

**UN Funding**

Nor has UN funding kept pace with the growth of complex disasters, a problem exacerbated by the ending of the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1987, the UN was called upon to undertake thirteen peacekeeping missions. It has completed thirteen others since then. By 1992 the unpaid arrears on the UN's aggregate costs had reached 10 per cent with the expectation that this would increase during the 1990s (Boutrous-Ghali, 1992). The decline in funding is clearly evinced in relation to UNHCR: a global nutritional crisis now exists amongst the world's growing refugee population following a real cut in finance (Keen, 1992). American spending on refugees, for example, dropped from US$20 to US$10 per head between 1985 and 1990. At a time of increasing dislocation, UNHCR's General Programme for Africa was cut from US$168 to US$152m in 1990. Apart from a growing nutritional crisis, this has resulted in cuts in programmes, especially social and rehabilitation work, and the growth of stop-gap food aid measures. UNICEF's Africa programmes have also been affected (Brittain, 1991).

**The Emergence of Political Conditionality**

The ending of the Cold War has given the North a greater degree of political flexibility in its relations with the South. European governments, for example, are now increasingly willing to link the receipt of aid with good governance and human rights (Pick, 1991b; van de Sand and Mohs, 1992). The new attitude is that donors have a right to decide how their money is spent (Benton, 1991). If this approach represented a genuine wish to tackle the issue of human rights abuse, it could be cautiously welcomed. Since it now also extends to humanitarian assistance, however, as shown in the 1990 donor brinkmanship in Sudan (Africa Watch, 1990c) and the current shameful neglect of Somalia, a different interpretation is possible.

In the present recessionary climate, public pressure has been the main reason for maintaining aid flow to Africa, albeit at an increasingly inadequate level. Rather than a real attempt to improve the
situation, the rhetoric of political conditionality appears more like an excuse for doing less (Brauer, 1991). One aspect of aid which does appear to have transferred to EE/FSU is the human skill and expertise factor previously concentrated in Africa (Benson and Clay, 1992). Old 'Africa hands' are increasingly turning up in the aid delegations now flooding into EE/FSU. Post-Cold War disaster relief in Africa will increasingly be left to NGOs and an impoverished UN to administer.

The Reform of the UN

By the end of the 1980s, a renewed interest in UN reform had begun to focus on areas of North/South political interdependence as reflected in complex disasters, narcotics, the transmission of disease and the environment (Gott, 1991). A 'political' and a 'pragmatic' approach to reform can be discerned (Rees, 1991). The political approach has highlighted the problem of human rights abuse associated with unlimited sovereignty. Concerned NGOs have usually followed this line and have called for such things as an international mandate for relief operations with guaranteed access to disaster victims (Oxfam, 1991b; Save the Children Fund, 1991). The radical change in the UN Charter that this would entail, however, together with the certain opposition of many Southern governments, are important reasons why the pragmatic approach has carried the day.

The basis of the pragmatic approach is an incremental introduction of organizational change which does not directly challenge the political underpinning of the UN Charter (Childers and Urquhart, 1991). Some changes in the mandates of the specialist agencies have already taken place. UNHCR, for example, has broadened its definition of a refugee so that it reflects more adequately African conditions (Keen, 1992). The main impetus for pragmatic change, however, has been the Gulf War. The allied intervention on behalf of the Kurds has been widely interpreted as a victory for the suspension of sovereignty in the interests of protecting minorities. In fact, the Gulf War represented a unique constellation of circumstances (Hampson, 1992). The resulting pressure placed upon the UN by the Northern allies to improve its disaster relief capability (G7, 1991) arose not from a new-found humanitarian agenda but from the fact that the inadequacies of the UN specialist agencies, especially the
inability of the UNHCR to cope with the resulting refugee crisis, threatened the wider military and strategic aims of the war (Pick, 1991a).

The result of this pressure, also supported by NGOs, was the appointment in early 1992 of a high level relief supremo within the UN charged with coordinating all aspects of major disaster relief. This move has accompanied other attempts at organizational change. In an Agenda for Peace (Boutrous-Ghali, 1992), the UN Secretary General sees an emerging division of labour between the UN and regional organizations which would leave the UN free to concentrate on the global issues of interdependence and, with a military capacity supplied by member nations, to act as a means of last resort in situations requiring intervention. Welcome as many of the organizational recommendations are, they do not tackle the issue of the severe constraints placed by the UN Charter on the guarantee and protection of human rights. Despite references to the era of ‘absolute and exclusive sovereignty’ having passed, the principle of sovereignty is still firmly embedded in the envisaged reform programme.

With regard to the Horn, the current direction of UN reform does not look promising. Whilst the call for the greater involvement of regional organizations can, after a fashion, be pursued in Europe, this is not so readily the case in Africa. The OAU, for example, has made no discernible attempt to intervene in Ethiopia, Sudan or Somalia. Since the start of increased involvement in the Horn, moreover, the UN has never been able to grasp the political dimensions of the situation. In Somalia, its conduct raises many serious questions (Africa Watch, 1992a) whilst in Sudan, it is the UN alone, out of all major donors including the World Bank, which is still supporting the government’s dubious urban relocation programme (Africa Watch, 1992b).

PROSPECTS FOR HALTING THE CONSOLIDATION OF PERMANENT EMERGENCY

With the possible exception of Eritrea and northern Ethiopia, a review of current trends would suggest that the prospects for confronting the further consolidation of an asset transfer economy across much of the Horn of Africa appears negligible. The possibility of developing an asset protection economy is even more
remote. NGOs and an increasingly financially and politically marginalized UN will be left to pick up those human pieces to which they are allowed access. The under-resourcing of disaster relief, together with the disarray and lack of political will within the international community on the question of guaranteeing humanitarian aid, play into the hands of those in the region who stand to gain from permanent emergency; for them, the future looks good.

NOTES

1. In terms of using legal means to politically marginalize migrant labour, however, there are also continuities with the present (Duffield, 1988).

2. In 1988, when travelling with Sudan's Prime Minister, Sadiq El Mahdi, I returned to Khartoum on a military transport from the besieged and starving town of Wau. The hold was filled with locally made furniture and wood crafts.

3. That the amounts conveyed were significant can be judged from the fact that the exchange rate on the Ugandan parallel currency market fluctuated according to the timing of the Juba convoy (Meagher, 1990).

4. The disruption of the coffee growing areas of southern Ethiopia underpinned the viability of this trade.

5. Although by the late 1980s about a hundred of these consortia existed on paper as operating in Sudan, only around twenty were actively involved in the safety net system which covered, in one way or another, several million people.

6. The celebrated 1989 UN Operation Life Line into south Sudan, for example, should have taken place at least two years earlier. By the time it did start, mortality had already peaked.

7. During the 1984–5 famine in the Horn, the World Bank augmented the position of WFP out of its own income. This income has now been used to establish the Bank's Trust Fund for the Former Soviet Union.

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